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''Black, White and Grey'' 
Warti111e Argu111ents for and against 
the Strategic Bo111ber Offensive 
David Ian Hall 
T he strategic bomber offensive against Nazi Germany has attracted 
more than its fair share of 
attention, most of which has 
been highly critical, both on 
moral as well as pragmatic 
grounds. Scholarly articles and 
books, in addition to a much 
larger number of sensationalized 
popular accounts, have 
appeared at a steady rate since 
Bomber Harris Trust impression that Canadian airmen, in concert with their 
British and American allies, 
waged a relentless, militarily 
ineffectual and wholly 




Category - First Place 
Roughly a year later, a British 
Broadcasting Corporation 
programme, Time Watch, 4 
examined the bomber offensive 
the end of the war. 1 More recently, journalists 
and television producers - capitalising on the 
fiftieth anniversary commemorations of the 
Second World War - have taken an interest in 
this controversial yet highly marketable and 
therefore profitable subject. Partly revisionist, 
and deliberately emotive, their "factions" (part 
fact and part dramatic recreation or fiction) all 
too often have focused narrowly on a single, 
spurious theme; the Anglo-American bomber 
offensive was orchestrated and conducted by a 
group of"bloodthirsty bone-heads and blimps," 
whose policy of saturation bombing was a 
grievous crime against humanity. 2 
Brian and Terence McKenna's 1992 
Canadian television (CBC-TV) documentary-
drama Death by Moonlight: Bomber Command 
stands out as a clear example of an historical 
event which has been taken out-of-context and 
seriously misrepresented through over 
simplification for television.3 In their haste to 
convey the brutality and senselessness of war, 
the McKennas presented a highly personalised 
and factually inaccurate account of Royal 
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) bomber operations 
in Europe from 1943 through 1945. Their 
programme left most viewers with the 
through an iniquitous question and answer 
session involving victims, ex-participants, 
historians and other expert witnesses. In rather 
short order this round table discussion 
deteriorated into a vitriolic shouting match. If 
its aim was to show the raw edge emotions still 
evoked by this subject, some 50 years on, then 
it was a huge success: if not, what was its point? 
To be fair, both the CBC and the BBC 
programmes offered a glimmer of hope that a 
meaningful debate was forthcoming; each, 
however, forsook the difficult task of 
distinguishing the innumerable and perplexing 
anomalies of the Anglo-American air offensive 
in favour of an inane black and white portrait of 
right and wrong with aircrew and air staff 
respectively singled out as innocent dupes and 
evil incarnate. 
Few today would deny the magnitude of 
horror that is modern war, least of all those who 
took part in either planning or flying bombing 
operations over Germany. To what purpose then 
do the crude and simplistic conclusions made 
by the air offensives most recent critics serve 
the cause of history, other than in a most 
disingenuous manner? They most definitely do 
not provide an objective account of these tragic 
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events for those who know little about them. The 
CBC. for example. sent a researcher to the RAF 
Air Historical Branch in London only after public 
criticism in Canada forced an investigation into 
the McKenna's programme Death by Moonlight. 5 
More worrisome still are the results of a poll 
commissioned by The Sunday Times in April 
1993. The newspaper revealed that 56 per cent 
of British children between 11 and 16 years of 
age obtained their knowledge of the Second 
World War from television. 6 If such a study were 
conducted in Canada the percentage would be 
considerably higher; the Second World War is 
not taught in Canadian schools and very few 
universities offer courses in Canadian military 
history. This might lead one to argue that 
television producers, among others, have a great 
responsibility to ensure that their educational 
programming is both accurate and objective. 
This essay, therefore, aims to redress the 
balance in this hotly contested debate by 
examining some of the wartime arguments both 
for and against the bomber offensive, in 
particular, it highlights the contrasting views of 
two men who served at Bomber Command 
Headquarters during the height of the campaign, 
Wing Commander T.D. (Harry) Weldon and RAF 
Chaplain L. John Collins. 7 The analysis itself 
inevitably concentrates upon the interpretation 
of the laws and strategic factors which governed 
the use of air forces in the Second World War, 
the course and development of the strategic air 
campaign, and the ethical position taken toward 
it by the Church of England. 
The history of the bomber offensive is 
extremely complex. If the documentary evidence 
condemning it, and those responsible for it, was 
that clear and irrefutable, historians would not 
still be debating the subject as fiercely as they 
do. The Anglo-American bomber campaign did 
not take place in a moral void or an ethical 
wasteland as some ofits most recent critics have 
suggested. A lively debate on its merits and 
morality took place both before and during the 
war. In fact, almost all of the principal arguments 
for and against mass aerial bombardment were 
set out well before the war began. 
Writing to the Archbishop of Canterbury, 
Cosmo Gordon Lang, in May 1939, Father 
Stephen Bedale, Warden ofKelham Theological 
College, called on the Church to speak out 
8 
against the "killing of helpless civilians by terror 
bombings."8 He wanted the Archbishop, as head 
of the official church ofthe state, to demand from 
the government a definite disavowal of any 
intention to resort to methods of terrorism in 
the likelihood of war. Be dale was not pro-Nazi. 
insincere or unpatriotic, or even a naive pacifist 
who objected to war in any shape or form. Rather, 
his objections were some of the more lucid ones 
to come out of a small but increasingly vocal 
protest movement in Britain against aerial 
bombardment. 
Bedale regretted the fact that the Church had 
been unable to forbid all resort to war, but he 
was not against Christian men bearing arms to 
resist or remedy injustice. Citing the teachings 
of both St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine 
he re-confirmed, unequivocally, that "to the state 
the temporal Sword has been committed by God 
for the maintenance of natural justice. and in 
the last resort that Sword must be used. "9 This 
right, however, as interpreted by Bedale, did not 
extend to the indiscriminate slaughter of 
noncombatant (or more precisely, the wounded, 
women and children). Consequently, he believed 
that the Church had a moral responsibility to 
more or less insist that the use of force be limited, 
and that considerations of natural compassion 
and common humanity be maintained when the 
force of arms was employed. Any resort to 
strategic bombing, claimed Bedale, would be 
tantamount to adopting a policy of terrorism that 
deliberately ignored these limits. 
The delicate and potentially far-reaching 
matter of the church participating in a public 
censuring of government policy was taken up by 
the Archbishop's personal chaplain, Reverend 
Alan C. Don, Dean of Westminster. Don 
proceeded cautiously, writing to Sir Kingsley 
Wood, the Secretary of State for Air, for 
clarification of the government's position on 
waging air warfare. Kingsley Wood appreciated 
the extent to which the subject of air 
bombardment and the fate of non-combatants 
worried the British public, both with regard to 
actual events over the last few years, namely in 
Spain and China, and their own more personal 
apprehensions about the future. He was, 
therefore, happy to oblige Lambeth Palace with 
a thorough and refreshingly honest reply. 
Kingsley Wood described the three basic 
principles that governed Britain's approach to 
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The primary aircraft of RAF 
Bomber Command -
Right: A Handley Page Halifax 
of 405 Squadron RCAF. 
(CFPU UK 1981) 
Below: An Avro Lancaster 
going about its job over an 
enemy port. 
(CFPU PL 144407) 
aerial warfare. First, the intentional 
bombardment of a civilian population was 
forbidden. Second, air forces were to attack 
military targets only, and third, airmen were to 
take reasonable care to avoid bombing any 
adjacent concentrations of civilians. 10 
These principles were, in fact, already part 
of the public record. The Prime Minister, Neville 
Chamberlain, promulgated them in the House 
of Commons on 21 June 1938, and from that 
date they governed the policy by which the RAF 
went to war in 1939. 1 1 Both satisfied and grateful 
to Kingsley Wood for setting the record straight, 
the Archbishop of Canterbury saw no need for 
the Church to become involved in telling the 
government how, or how not, to wage war. So 
long as the rules of war were observed the 
Church would (and did) stand by the 
government. 12 
Unfortunately it was with "the rules" that the 
controversy over strategic bombing began. Prior 
to the Second World War and its course of events, 
internationally agreed rules governing air warfare 
did not exist. ~:3 The 1923 Hague Draft Rules of 
Aerial Warfare was the first authoritative attempt 
to clarify and formulate a comprehensive code 
of conduct, but they were never adopted in legally 
binding terms. 14 Growing awareness of the 
military potential of aircraft throughout the 
1920s and 1930s ultimately proved too serious 
an obstacle to reaching an agreement. 
One of the main stumbling blocks was the 
inability to establish an acceptable definition of 
a legitimate military target under the new 
conditions of total war between industrialised 
states. Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby summed 
up this conundrum nicely when he wrote: 
It is generally agreed, for example, that the man 
who loads or fires a field-gun is a military target. 
So is the gun itself, and the ammunition dump 
which supplies it. So is the truck-driver who 
transports ammunition from the base to the 
dump. So- in the last two World Wars- was the 
man who transported weapons, ammunition, 
raw materials, etc., by sea. But are the weapons 
and war-like stores on their way from the 
factories to the bases, and the men who transport 
them, not also military targets? And what about 
weapons under construction in the factories, and 
9 
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the men who make them? Are they not also 
military targets? And if they are not, where do 
you draw the line? If they are military targets, 
are not the industrial areas and the services--
gas, electricity-- that keep industry going, also 
military targets? Or is it permissible to starve 
these civilian workers by blockade, or shell them 
if you can get at them, but not to bomb them 
from the air? This is surely a 'reductio ad 
absurdum.' 15 
Factories making armaments and the 
transport bringing them to the battlefronts 
naturally were included in the category of 
legitimate targets once the means of attacking 
them were available. Consequently those 
civilians in them or dangerously close to them 
might just have to be equated with civilians in 
legitimately attacked places. Moreover, precedent 
was on the side of the air planners. Naval 
bombardment of ports and towns was an 
accepted act of war. It was even codified in Article 
2 of the Convention on Naval Bombardment, 
signed at The Hague in 1907. Article 2 stipulated 
that a naval commander who used his ships' 
guns to destroy military objectives in an 
undefended port or town "incur[red] no 
responsibility for any unavoidable damage which 
may be caused by a bombardment under such 
circumstances.''IG The advent of air power merely 
increased the opportunity of reaching and 
destroying such targets. 
International law did not protect civilians 
from bombardment from the sea, the ground, 
or the air. Even so, indiscriminate bombing of 
the civilian population was not widely embraced 
as a principal object for attack by air forces. By 
the early 1930s the Royal Air Force had already 
rejected indiscriminate bombing as a possible 
"short cut" to victory. Moral objections to the 
bombing of thickly populated areas without 
warning, did influence official policy, 17 but of 
greater importance was the Air Staffs own 
appraisal that bombing civilians, as a primary 
target of war, was uneconomical. Their 
preference was to employ Britain's small bomber 
force, with maximum emphasis on accurate 
bombing, against objectives most likely to 
damage the enemy's war effort. Two targets 
singled out for such air attack were war-related 
industry and rail transportation. 18 
On 2 September 1939, on the very eve of 
Britain and France's entry into the second major 
10 
European war this century, the two governments 
declared that only "strictly military objectives in 
the narrowest sense of the word" would be 
bombed by their respective air forces. The Allies 
made this declaration in part because they were 
anxious to avoid a strategic bombing exchange 
with Germany's superior Luftwaffe. a contest 
they believed they would lose. Unexpectedly, and 
somewhat surprisingly, the German government 
pledged similar restraint, although the course 
of events quickly demonstrated its hollow ring. 
Mass air attacks by the Luftwaffe on Warsaw. 
between 20-25 September, inflicted heavy 
casualties on the civilian population. 19 The die 
had been cast. Speaking to a large audience in 
Manchester, Winston Churchill, the soon-to-be 
British Prime Minister and war leader, 
condemned German military decisions made 
without thought to humanitarian concerns. "We 
know from what they did in Poland," Churchill 
told his anxious listeners, "that there is no 
brutality or bestial massacre of civilians by air 
bombing which they would not readily commit 
if they thought it was for their advantage."2o 
Ruthlessness is unpleasant to say the least, 
but it is not necessarily illegal. In other words, 
one can be both ruthless and operate within the 
law. Indeed, there is a powerful argument that 
the Germans were operating within the existing 
tolerances, as they were, for air attacks on city 
centres and civilians. 21 
Churchill's assessment that questions of 
ethical or humanitarian concerns had no place 
in the German style of aggressive warfare was 
accurate, although it was based more on 
emotional sentiment than on any accepted legal 
definition. Nonetheless, if the indiscriminate 
bombing of Warsaw was not enough to validate 
his message to the British people, the Luftwaffe's 
concentrated attack on Rotterdam on 13 May 
1940 removed any remaining doubts concerning 
German intentions and practice. Without regard 
to civilian casualties, the Luftwaffe was used to 
break the last enemy resistance. The southern 
part of the city was transformed into rubble. 
According to notes left by General von Waldau, 
chief of the Luftwaffe command staff responsible 
for planning the attack, "this radical method was 
the only one possible." His chilling conclusion, 
noting that, "The complete surrender of Holland 
followed only two hours later, "22 reflected the only 
justification the Germans required for the action 
4
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taken. For the first time in history, strategic air 
forces were the decisive influence in bringing 
about an end to a military campaign. 
Meanwhile, in Britain, pressure continued 
to mount for retaliatory strikes against German 
cities and towns. 23 Leading letters in many 
British newspapers regularly asked why the air 
force was not being used against Germany. Up 
until May 1940, RAF raids were confined to 
attacks on German naval units at sea, or at 
anchor, and no serious attempts were made to 
drop bombs on the German mainland. The 
Luftwaffe's ruthless bombing of Rotterdam, and 
Germany's inexorable land offensive against 
France precipitated a change in the RAF's policy 
of restraint. On 15 May the War Cabinet gave 
Bomber Command permission to bomb the 
Ruhr. Initial targets included oil refineries and 
the railway network, two target systems that were 
to feature prominently throughout the remaining 
years of the war. Bomber crews were given 
specific aiming points, and they were instructed 
to return home to their bases with their bombs, 
if they could not locate the target, rather than 
drop them indiscriminately on innocent civilians. 
Even during the midst of the Luftwaffe's night 
blitz on British cities, when the Cabinet 
considered switching some of the weight of the 
RAF"s counterattack over to German civilians, 
the Air Staff argued that "nothing would be 
gained by promiscuous bombing. "24 Only when 
it was realised that the bombers lacked the 
technical sophistication necessary to hit precise 
targets did entire industrial cities become their 
objective. 25 
On 14 February 1942, a new Directive 
marked a substantial change in British air policy. 
Bomber Command was instructed to shift the 
primary emphasis of its attacks on to specific 
"industrial areas." Essen, the heart of the Ruhr's 
industrial complex, with its heavy industry 
including the Krupps armament works, was 
singled out as the most important target for 
attack. The stated as well as intended aim of the 
new policy was the progressive destruction and 
dislocation of the German military and economic 
system. A corollary objective was the 
undermining of the morale of the German people, 
and in particular, that of the industrial workers, 
to a point where their capacity for resistance was 
fatally weakened. Civilians per se were not the 
object of attack, but the days had long since past 
when moral objections protected them even from 
indirect bombardment. 26 
Area bombing was the main policy for 1942, 
and it more or less remained as such until the 
spring of 1945.27 It was around the same time 
that the RAF adopted an area bombing strategy 
that the Reverend John Collins was posted to 
RAF Station Yatesbury in Wiltshire. Collins 
joined the RAF Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR) as 
an Anglican Chaplain in 1940. Before that he 
had enjoyed a distinguished career, both in 
academia and the Church. 28 His posting to 
Yatesbury marked the start of what was to 
become a deep personal transformation that 
would have a profound influence on the rest of 
his life, including that of founding the British 
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 29 
RAF Yates bury in 1940 was a large bustling 
training centre for air gunners and wireless 
operators as well as wireless and radar operators 
in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF). There 
were in excess of five Air Wings training on the 
station throughout most of the war. The camp 
had its own sports facilities, hospital, cinema 
and theatre. It also had six resident chaplains of 
various denominations, 30 each with their own 
chapels. Church attendance was not high but 
the chaplains were kept very busy caring for 
those who found the demands of their course 
and the war too stressful. Collins lent an 
additional hand at the hospital when he was not 
overburdened with normal counselling duties.:11 
After a few months at Yatesbury, Collins 
noted with distress that many of the young men 
and women passing through the camp had 
actively turned away from the Church of England. 
He put it down to dislocation and deprivation, 
not to mention the horror and revulsion, brought 
on by the recent war. A similar decline in faith 
had occurred towards the end, and during the 
years immediately after, the Great War 1914-
1918. Nevertheless it was a worrying trend that 
Collins aimed to reverse. Beginning in the spring 
of 1942 he inaugurated a series of Tuesday 
evening discussions that were designed to 
enhance Christian fellowship on the station. By 
July a formal membership had developed and 
"The Fellowship of the Transfiguration of Our 
Lord" was born. 32 
ll 
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Members of this new Christian society 
pledged themselves to the service of God and 
their fellow human beings. A short list of rules 
entitled "The Fellowship Rules of Life" was drawn 
up to guide them in their efforts. Personal 
responsibilities included making a strong 
commitment to Christian practices, regular 
church attendance, taking Holy Communion, 
daily prayers. and bible reading. Collins, as 
founder, president and spiritual leader, 
encouraged an active, aggressive Christianity. He 
wanted the Fellowship to be a public display of 
faith in defiance of the terrible times in which 
they lived, and in the face of religious scepticism. 
The Fellowship's main objective, as set out in 
rule number nine, was "To try to make the social, 
economic and political implications of the gospel 
effective in local and national affairs." Collins 
believed this was possible through individual 
choice and public example. 33 
12 
The bomb bay of a Lancaster X prior to a raid on 
the Ruhr. The relatively short distance to the target 
allowed a full load of bombs to be carried- 20 x 500 
lb high explosive. general purpose bombs for a total 
of 10.000 lbs. 
(CFPU PL 40683) 
The first members of the Fellowship came 
from the staff and the discharged patients of the 
camp hospital, where Collins, through his 
volunteer work, had developed a considerable 
reputation as a devout Christian and a 
compassionate man. Throughout the year the 
membership widened and grew. ~14 "Padre John," 
as he was affectionately known at Yatesbury, had 
found a willing audience. The "Tuesday talks" 
retained their place of predominance, with 
Collins speaking on aspects of Christianity. 
international brotherhood, the war, and, amongst 
other things, the RAF's bombing policy. Collins 
was not against the war for he honestly believed 
that Hitler and the Nazis were an evil force that 
had to be overthrown if God's peace on earth 
was to be achieved. What disturbed Collins, and 
what he believed was unacceptable, was the 
spiralling escalation of indiscriminate violence 
and wanton destruction (which he perceived as 
being peculiar to this ghastly war) and was 
epitomised in part by the aerial bombardment 
of cities and towns. 35 
Collins, like Bedale before him in 1939, and 
a number of other English clerics~'6 during the 
war, objected to the proportionate increase in 
violence and destruction aerial bombardment 
brought to the waging of war. Moreover, they 
lamented its propensity to kill large numbers of 
civilians. For them, strategic bombing was an 
immoral act of war because of the crude and 
inaccurate techniques inherent in its method. 
Unlike Shakespeare's tragic character Macbeth, 
who confessed grimly, "I have supped full with 
horrors: Direness, familiar to my slaughterous 
thoughts, Cannot once start me. "~' 7 Collins and 
other like-minded critics rejected the natural 
consequences of war. In particular, they denied 
the physical reality of war when waged with the 
most recent weapons produced by modern 
technology. It was as if they were saying war could 
become more decent and more tolerable once 
bombing was banned. 
6
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Few would argue that the objections to area 
bombing raised by Collins and his supporters 
were not heartfelt and sincere, even though many 
of those making them were better known for their 
unctuousness than lucid argument. 38 
Collectively, they also betrayed a naive 
understanding of the dialectic between morality 
and war. After all, it is not so much a case of this 
or that means of waging war that is immoral or 
inhumane. War itself is immoral. Once full-scale 
war has broken out the means for limiting its 
barbarities, excesses and horrors are virtually 
non-existent. The moral question then is whether 
or not it is imperative to fight the war at all? If 
the answer is yes, then the proper course, indeed 
the moral obligation implicitly undertaken by 
going to war, is to win as quickly and as cheaply 
as possible. A degree of restraint may be self-
imposed by the potential victor's desire to win a 
decent peace, but for the nation facing defeat, 
similar concern for the future may not apply. 39 
Legal and moral principles against which the 
supposed "acceptable" strategies of war are 
tested, are themselves tested against reality. They 
are not an absolute. In the British case, the RAF 
went out of its way to avoid bombing civilians in 
the early stages of the war. After nearly three 
years of at best disappointing results, the Air 
Staff accepted the fact that they could not 
prosecute the war successfully with their existing 
technology so long as the self-imposed 
restrictions designed to limit collateral damage 
were maintained. Their bombing policy, 
therefore, was adjusted to fit the conditions and 
the circumstances deemed necessary to win the 
war. The efficacy of the area bombing policy, as 
practised from 1942 to 1945, is yet another 
fiercely disputed and equally contentious 
subject. 40 But with regard to its morality, it really 
becomes a question of how many of one's own 
people is one prepared to sacrifice on the altar 
of ethics? 
Most of Britain's churchmen supported the 
bomber offensive in its various stages of 
development throughout the war. "Often in life 
there is no clear choice between absolute right 
and wrong; frequently the choice had to be made 
of the lesser of two evils," wrote Dr. Cyril Garbett, 
the Archbishop of York, "and it is a lesser evil to 
bomb a war-loving Germany than to sacrifice the 
lives of thousands of our own fellow-
countrymen ... and to delay delivering millions 
now held in slavery." Having established his point 
of principle, Garbett went one step further and 
presented a compelling argument in favour of 
the Allies using their air superiority to bring the 
war to a swift and successful conclusion. His 
views were published in The Times on 25 June 
1943, with the unequivocal approval of Lambeth 
Palace. 
William Temple, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, just like Cosmo Lang before him, 
said much the same as Garbett about the bomber 
offensive. Reluctantly, yet with unwavering 
conviction, the Archbishop accepted it as a 
necessary evil in a far from perfect human world. 
One of the many letters Temple wrote in reply to 
critics, who assailed him for not demanding an 
immediate end to the bombing of large cities, is 
worth quoting in detail, In December 1942, he 
responded in fairly typical fashion to a letter from 
Ashley Sampson, the representative of a group 
of eminent Christian clergy and laity, including 
C.S. Lewis, who were publishing a "Manifesto" 
against bombing: 
What your Manifesto really requires is that we 
should not attempt to destroy munitions factories 
which supply the enemy or the power stations 
and the like which enable those factories to work. 
Attack upon such objectives from the air must 
involve great risk to the people living round with 
the practical certainty that many of them will be 
killed. The same will happen if harbours are 
attacked which the Manifesto includes as 
legitimate objects. 
The Archbishop concluded his letter to Sampson 
with a general consideration of the war and the 
place of bombing in it, writing: 
In my mind we have no business to be at war at 
all unless by fighting we can, or believe we can, 
serve the purpose of God. If believing that we 
enter upon war it becomes a primary duty to 
fight effectively. Indeed, this consideration then 
takes precedence of nearly all others. The worst 
of all things is to fight and do it ineffectively. 
Therefore while I agree with you that the strategic 
consideration cannot stand alone it becomes very 
nearly decisive for our conduct. 41 
Sampson wrote back two days later, expressing 
his deep regret that the Archbishop would not 
sponsor the Manifesto. 
13 
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Cosmo Lang, William Temple, Geoffrey 
Fisher42 and Cyril Carbett were not dutiful 
sycophants to a government that had appointed 
them to the highest ecclesiastical offices in the 
land. Even a cursory reading of their private 
correspondence and papers will reveal four 
deeply sensitive men who abhorred war: but also 
men who recognised that a far greater crime 
would be inflicted upon humanity if the war 
against Nazi Germany was lost. Their views were 
not shared by all members of the Anglican 
Church, and as the bomber offensive intensified 
during the last three years of the war so did the 
disapprobation. George Bell, the Bishop of 
Chichester, was perhaps the most persistent and 
most celebrated critic. From 1940 onwards he 
waged a highly public campaign against strategic 
bombing in the national papers and in 
Parliament. 43 Collins too continued with his own 
protest, but his took a more surreptitious route 
through the Fellowship of the Transfiguration of 
Our Lord. 
During 1943 and 1944 Collins invited 
numerous individuals of high rank and public 
acclaim to Yatesbury to speak to the members 
of his Fellowship. Left-wing and "progressive" 
speakers were preferred because they were more 
likely to provide an alternative view to the war. 
Above and Below -
Left: A British bomber releases a load of bombs 
(including a 4,000 lb "cookie" and many smaller 
incendiary bombs) over a cloud covered target in 
Germany. 
(CFPU PL 144267) 
Below: The smashed city qf Cologne. the target qf' 
over 22 attacks by RAF Bomber Command alone. 
(CFPU PL 42538) 
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Through the unconventional opmwns of his 
chosen guests, Collins aimed to challenge the 
membership. He hoped they would see the events 
taking place around them in a different light to 
that of the official sources they were more 
commonly exposed. Collins particularly liked to 
invite well-known Labour members of 
Parliament who openly opposed the so-called 
"yes" policy of most national politicians. Some 
of the speakers included Sir Stafford Cripps, 
Clement Attlee, Aneurin Bevan, Herbert 
Morrison, C.S. Lewis, and the Soviet 
Ambassador Ivan Maisky. Government 
representatives from China, Poland, Belgium and 
Czechoslovakia were also invited to speak to the 
Fellowship, and even the King of Greece made 
an "unofficial" visit to Yatesbury. 44 
Collins strongly believed that every member 
of society, according to individual opportunity 
and ability, had an important part to play in 
attempting to make Christian values apply in 
national and international affairs. In fact, in his 
view, committed Christians had an obligation to 
get actively involved in public life and to press 
government leaders for a policy more and more 
in line with the teachings of the Gospel. Only in 
this way, Collins maintained, could the world's 
past and present failures be avoided in the future. 
The celebrity lectures were an important part of 
this awakening process for members of the 
Fellowship, and they served to rally the faithful 
to Collins' vision of a better world. They were 
not part of any official or ordinary education 
programme at Yatesbury, nor were they viewed 
with equanimity by the camp commandant and 
the Air Staff. Nonetheless the "Yates bury lectures" 
were allowed to proceed as organised, and all 
were well attended with the numbers ranging 
from the low eighties to just over two hundred. 45 
In the summer of 1944, Collins was posted 
from RAF Yatesbury to Bomber Command 
Headquarters, High Wycombe. Bomber 
Command was in need of a new chaplain and 
Harris himself selected Collins to fill the vacancy. 
Harris' choice was not as odd as it may first 
appear. Collins married Diana Elliot, a cousin 
of the AOC-in-C, in 1939, and was therefore a 
member of Harris' extended family. 46 Collins was 
sad to leave Yatesbury, 47 and the Fellowship that 
he had created, but he quickly settled into his 
new surroundings and immediately set to the 
task of organising another Christian Fellowship 
group and a celebrity lecture series. Invited 
speakers included Sir Stafford Cripps, Herbert 
Morrison, Ellen Wilkinson from the Ministry of 
Home Security (Home Office), Anthony Eden and 
Sir Richard Acland. Sir Stafford Cripps, the then 
Minister of Aircraft Production and a Christian 
moralist, gave the first lecture on 8 December, 
taking as his theme "The Necessity for 
Pacifism. "48 
After a convivial dinner in the senior staff 
mess, Cripps addressed a mixed group of slightly 
less than 100 officers, NCOs and air crew, in the 
largest assembly hall on the station, the Air Staff 
Conference Room. He began by saying he would 
try to answer a rather disturbing question- "Is 
God My Co-Pilot?"- which had been put to him 
by an operational pilot stationed in the north of 
England. "Wherever you were God was looking 
over your shoulder," Cripps told an increasingly 
unsettled audience. Continuing on this theme at 
some length, in a religious vein more applicable 
to a church sermon than a sociable lecture, he 
said that God was present at all times even when 
an act of wickedness was being committed. A 
pilot then could consider God as his co-pilot 
"only if he was convinced that the job he was 
doing was essential for the good of humanity." 
Cripps then pointed at the officers in the 
auditorium and said, "it was, therefore, very 
important for those responsible to be sure that 
no pilot is sent to undertake any bombing 
operation which is not absolutely essential for 
military purposes." The question period that 
followed was acrimonious and slightly hostile, 
but the evening concluded without incident. 49 
Collins, for his part, had accomplished what he 
had set out to do. He had spread a seed of doubt 
- at Bomber Command Headquarters of all 
places- that bombing was wrong and that each 
and every participant had to reflect upon their 
own individual responsibility for its continuation 
against the test of Christian principles. 
Not surprisingly, the lecture was not well 
received by the staff officers, and even less so by 
Sir Arthur Harris when he heard about it the 
following morning. Harris did not attend the now 
infamous lecture having sent Air Marshal 
Saundby to receive their guest and chair the 
meeting. In fact, Harris never had any use for 
Sir Stafford Cripps; he only agreed to his coming 
to give a lecture because he thought it was 
impolitic to refuse. In its aftermath, Harris was 
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aghast that the man who was personally in 
charge of the Ministry overseeing the production 
of heavy bombers. and who was straining every 
sinew of British industry to increase output, 
would publicly condemn Bomber Command's 
methods and the Government policy that 
directed them, both of which the very minister 
in question was directly responsible for making. 
In an effort to counter the argument presented 
by Cripps - a sort of damage control exercise -
Harris called a compulsory meeting for officers 
and all other ranks available, to which he invited 
his Personal Assistant, Wing Commander T.D. 
Weldon, 50 a tutor in Moral Philosophy at 
Magdalen College Oxford, to speak on the subject 
of born bing. 51 
Weldon had been at High Wycombe since 
1942. Upon his arrival he quickly became a great 
admirer of Harris, and he was instrumental in 
helping to establish a special guest room at 
Springfield, Harris' official residence, where 
papers and photographs outlining the workings 
and achievements of Bomber Command were 
displayed. Known as the "Conversion Chamber," 
its purpose was to demonstrate to disbelievers 
that bombing really was destroying German 
industrial areas. Using his intimate knowledge 
of this material, Weldon was able to give an 
exhaustive discourse on the bomber offensive 
to a somewhat captive audience. 52 
Weldon began his lecture by praising the 
work carried out by Bomber Command. During 
the long dark period following the British Army's 
evacuation from Dunkirk, Bomber Command 
and later the Anglo-American strategic bomber 
forces, were alone in taking the offensive against 
Nazi Germany. For three years, between June 
1941 and June 1944, the bombing of Germany 
was the only direct military assistance given by 
the Western Allies to the Russians. Area bombing 
attacks upon the vital centres of German war 
production, Weldon pointed out, materially 
reduced the enemy's war potential. They also 
forced the Germans to employ in defence, repair 
and rehabilitation measures, huge resources of 
materiel and manpower which would otherwise 
have been used in strengthening the offensive 
power of their armed forces. By the progressive 
destruction and dislocation of the German 
military, industrial and economic systems, the 
strategic bomber forces paved the way for the 
Allied armies, re-entry into Europe, and later 
16 
supported their advance by undermining the 
enemy's ability to present cohesive resistance. 
Finally, with regard to the question of morality, 
Weldon categorically denied that Bomber 
Command had ever gone in for acts ofterrorism. 
The air attacks on German cities, he concluded, 
were strategically justified because they aimed 
to shorten the war and thereby reduce to a 
minimum the loss of human life. 53 
Harris was satisfied with Weldon's effort. 
Nevertheless, neither Collins nor Weldon could 
take much credit for changing the individual 
opinions held on bombing by the officers and 
men at Bomber Command Headquarters, The 
unintended and indirect confrontation between 
Collins and Weldon over the ethics of bombing, 
or as Collins called it "the Bombing of Ethics," 
did, however, ask and attempt to answer three 
seminal questions in this controversy: Was the 
bomber offensive immoral and a crime against 
humanity? Was it a legitimate act of war? Was it 
effective? Worlds of perception separated the 
protagonists then as now. Today, some 50 years 
on, little has changed in this distinctly polarised 
debate. 
While acknowledging that there are plenty 
of valid criticisms that can be levelled at the way 
the Anglo-American bomber campaign was 
conducted, it is equally clear that bombing 
steadily eroded Germany's capacity to make war. 
Albert Speer, perhaps Hitler's favourite confidant 
and his Minister of Armaments and Munitions, 
is but one of many former enemies who called 
the bomber offensive "the greatest lost battle on 
the German side. "54 The diaries of Dr. Joseph 
Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda, contain 
numerous references to the devastating effect 
Allied bombing had on the German economy, 
people and armed forces. 55 Similar testimonials 
are to be found in the biographies, diaries and 
memoirs of a host of German commanders, 
including Kesselring, Rommel, von Rundstedt, 
von Manteuffel and von Mallenthin, to name but 
a few of the more prominent ones. 56 Britain's 
official historians reached the same general 
conclusion that strategic bombing made "a 
contribution to victory which was decisive. "57 
More recent scholarly research confirms the 
immediate post-war analysis. Richard Overy, a 
distinguished historian at King's College, 
London, examined Germany's war economy in 
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detail and concluded that "bombing had obvious 
effects in reducing worker morale and destroying 
facilities. "58 His research demonstrates that 
bombing placed a ceiling on German war 
production and - despite an increase in 
production in 1943 and 1944 - reduced the 
output of tanks by 35 per cent and aircraft by 
31 per cent. 59 Professor Sir Michael Howard, who 
fought in the Second World War and who has 
studied, lectured and published on the subject 
for more than half a century, is perhaps the most 
eminent historian to speak out in support ofthe 
strategic air offensives results. He recently told 
a distinguished audience of historians at the RAF 
Club, Piccadilly, that the strategic air offensive 
in Europe, "made an absolutely essential 
contribution to the victory that was achieved by 
the armed forces of the Allies fighting in three 
elements. "60 Present and future critics would do 
well to bear in mind a further admonition from 
the official historians, who, some 30 years ago 
wrote, "those who claim that the Bomber 
Command contribution to the war was less than 
this are factually in error. "61 
What then is the importance of the debate 
between Collins and Weldon? Through a 
combination of unconnected circumstances both 
men ended up at Bomber Command 
Headquarters where they were forced to search 
the very depths of their inner-most beliefs in an 
attempt to reconcile unreconcilable questions. 
Their struggle demonstrates the range of inquiry 
that is possible in a democratic society, even 
during the stresses of war. Their differing 
perspectives also add much to our 
understanding of both the bomber offensive and 
the deep and often tortuous emotions it conjured 
up, both during the war, and in its aftermath. In 
short. they inject a useful and much needed 
degree of balance back into a debate which 
recently has succumbed to a series of woefully 
superficial studies plagued as too many ofthem 
are by emotive hyperbole weakly disguised as 
empirical fact. Debate and disagreement are 
possible without distorting either the facts or 
the truth. If journalists and others are going to 
deal with history they have a responsibility to 
their audiences to delve more deeply into their 
topic and not sacrifice the complexities in a facile 
overview. It is for this reason that in the wider 
history of strategic bombing the small part 
played by a conscientious cleric and a secular 
scholar merit our attention and our study. 
Notes 
1. Published material on the bomber offensive, and the Royal 
Air Force's participation in it, is so exhaustive that to list 
even the most important titles would go beyond the scope 
of any bibliography. Some published works of lasting 
significance include: Sir Charles Webster and Noble 
Frankland, The Strategic Air O)Jensive Against 
Germany, 4 vols. (London, 1961): J.M. Spaight, Bombing 
Vindicated (London. 1944); Sir Arthur Harris, Bomber 
Q[fensive (London, 194 7) and Despatch on War 
Operations with an introduction by Sebastian Cox and a 
German view by Horst Boog (London, 1996); Lord 
Tedder, Air Power in War (London, 1948); Sir Robert 
Saundby, Air Bombardment (London, 1961); Martin 
Middlebrook, The Nuremberg Raid (London, 1973); 
Barrie Paskins and Michael Doc krill, "Area Bombing,'' in 
The Ethics of War (London, 1979); Richard Overy, The 
Air War 1939-1945 (London, 1980): Charles Messenger, 
Bomber Harris and the Strategic Air Q[[ensive (London, 
1984); John Terraine, The Right Q{ the Line (London, 
1985 ); Malcolm Smith, "The Allied Air Offensive," Journal 
of Strategic Studies v.13, no.1 (March 1990); Horst Boog 
(ed.), The Conduct qf the Air War in the Second World 
War(Oxford, 1991); RAF Historical Society (ed.), Reaping 
the Whirlwind Bracknell Paper No.4, A Symposium on 
the Strategic Bomber Offensive 1939-45 (26 March 1993); 
and Sir Michael Howard. "Ethics, Deterrence and 
Strategic Bombing," The Journal of the RAF Historical 
Society No.14 ( 1995 ). 
2. For example: "Bomber Harris," British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC). first televised September 1989; 
"Death by Moonlight," second episode of The Valour and 
the Horror, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation and 
National Film Board war series (CBC/NFB), first aired in 
Canada in February 1992, and in the UK on Channel 4 in 
August 1994; and "The Bombing of Dresden," BBC 2 
(Time Watch), April1993. Max Hastings, now the editor 
of The Daily Mail, made many of the same exaggerated 
criticisms of the Air Staff and the senior officers at Bomber 
Command in his book, Bomber Command (London, 
1979). 1\vo recent though equally controversial accounts 
include: Brereton Greenhous, Stephen Harris, William 
Johnston, and William Rawling, The Crucible Q{ War 
1939-1945, The Official History of the RCAFv.Ill (Toronto, 
1994); and Merrily Weisbord and Merilyn Simonds Mohr, 
"Night Flights: The Boys of Bomber Command" in The 
Valour and the Horror (Toronto, 1991) pp.61-1 1 7. 
3. Many historians have labelled "Death by Moonlight" "a 
substandard work,'' "seriously flawed," and "a gross 
distortion of[ a] very complex subject." Detailed criticisms, 
with attribution, can be read in an official report published 
by the Canadian Senate, The Valour and Horror: Report 
of the Standing Senate Commiltee on Social Affairs. 
Science and Technology (Ottawa, 1993) pp.10:910:34, 
and 10:48. In addition, see Channel 4 (UK) "Right to 
Reply," August 1994; David J. Bercuson and S.F. Wise 
(eds.) The Valour and the Horror Revisited (Montreal. 
1994 ); and The Bomber Harris Trust's own publication, 
A Balilejor Truth. 




Hall: “Black, White and Grey”
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998
5. Discussion with Sebastian Cox, Head, Air Historical 
Branch (RAF), on 22 March 1997, at the Royal Military 
College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario. 
6. Martin Jacques. '"From here to eternity,'" The Sunday 
Times, 9 May 1993, Section 9, pp.24-25. 
7. Collins receives significantly more attention throughout 
this essay for two main reasons: he participated in the 
public debate on strategic bombing much earlier than 
did Weldon. and the documentary evidence covering his 
wartime activities is far richer. 
8. Letter from Father Stephen Bedale to Cosmo Lang, 
Archbishop of Canterbury. 23 May 1939. Lambeth Palace 
Library. C. Lang Papers v.80 [hereafter cited as LPL. 
manuscript collection and volume number] Bedale also 
sent copies of this letter to the Archbishop of York and 
the Bishop of Southwell. 
9. Bedale to Archbishop of Canterbury, 23 May 1939. LPL, 
C. Lang Papers v.80. 
10. Letters exchanged between Rev. A. C. Don and Sir Kingsley 
Wood, 2-12 June 1939. LPL, C. Lang Papers v.80. 
11. Sir Charles Webster and Noble Frankland, The Strategic 
Air Q[[ensive Against Germany 1939-1945 volumes l-4 
(London, 1961) v.4, pp. 71-83. Hereafter cited as SAOG 
and volume number. See also Adam Roberts and Richard 
Guelff(eds.), Documents on the Laws of War, 2nd edition 
(Oxford. 1989) p.l22. 
12. LPL, C. Lang Papers v.80, '"Allied Bombing of Germany, 
1939-1941." See also W. Temple Papers v.57 '"Defence of 
British Bombing Policy. 1942-1944" and G. Fisher Papers 
v.5 '"War 1939-1945." 
13. Unlike either land or sea warfare, a formally binding 
agreement which deals with air warfare exclusively still 
does not exist. See Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff 
(eds.), Documents on the Laws q[War. p.l22. 
14. For a short history of the first attempts to codify rules for 
air warfare, beginning in 1899 and through the 62 Articles 
of the 1923 Hague Rules of Aerial Warfare to the present 
day, see Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff (eds.), 
Documents on the Laws of War pp.l2l-l35, 
15. Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby, "The Ethics of 
Bombing." RAFQuarterly (Summer 1967) p.97. 
16. The full text ofihe 1907 Hague Conventions can be read 
in A. P. Higgins. The Hague Peace Conference and Other 
International Coriferences Concerning the Laws and 
Usages o.f War: Texts and Conventions With 
Commentaries (Cambridge, 1909). 
17. Public Records Office [PRO] AIR 69113 "Employment of 
Air Forces in War," Staff Paper by Air Commodore P.B. 
Joubert, 31 October 1931, p.l9. 
18. PRO AIR 69/14 '"Notes on Air Strategy" by Air Vice-
Marshal Wilfrid R. Freeman for a lecture given at the Staff 
College, Camberley. 7 December 1935, p.3: and AIR 2 I 
675 "War Aim of the RAF, 1933-1939," Commandant's 
Lecture Notes- 1933. RAF Staff College, Andover. pp.l2-
l3, 
19. Militargeschichiliches Forschungsamt, Freiburg im 
Breisgau, Deutschland. Germany and the Second World 
War v.II, Translated by D. McMurry and E. Osers (Oxford. 
1991). pp.121-122. Hereafter cited as Germany and the 
Second World War and volume number. 
20. Imperial War Museum, Department of Documents, Speech 
given by Winston Churchill at Manchester on 27 January 
1940, Hereafter cited as lWM, document title and 
accession number. 
21. For German views on the legality of the Luftwaffe's 
strategic bombing operations up to 1942 see the four 
essays in Chapter V "'Air Warfare and Humanity" in Horst 
18 
Boog (ed.), The Conduct qF the Air War in the Second 
World War, pp.298-404. 
22. General von Waldau in Germany and the Second World 
War. v.II. pp.337-338. 
23. See The Sunday Times ( 14 January 1940) for the most 
detailed argument in favour of bombing Germany. See 
also Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in 
the Second World War v.l, (London, 1970), pp.176-l77. 
24. J.R.M. Butler, Grand Strategy v.II (London. 1957) p.4ll. 
For the Air Staffs position against bombing the civilian 
population. see PRO AIR 19 I 186 '"Bombing Policy." Draft 
Paper by CAS, Air Marshal Sir Charles Portal, for the 
Secretary of State for Air. 30 October 1940. 
25. In August 1941 a statistical examination of Bomber 
Command aiming photographs was undertaken. H 
revealed that only one fifth of the aircraft despatched 
bombed within a five mile radius of U1e target. For details 
of this study see the Butt Report. reproduced in its entirely 
in SAOG v.IV, pp.205-213. 
26. SAOG v.IV. pp.143-148. As a matter of additional interest 
Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris did not take over as AOC-
in-C Bomber Command unti123 February 1942. at which 
time the policy of area bombing had already been 
established. 
27. A comprehensive selection of the bombing Directives 
issued to Bomber Command. ouUining the va1ious stages 
and progression of the strategic air campaign from 1940 
to 1945, can be found in SAOG v.IV, Section Ill. pp.l 07-
184. 
28. Educated at Sidney Sussex College and Westcott House. 
Cambridge, Collins went on to become a Minor Canon at 
St. Paul's Cathedral. From 1931-1935 he served as a 
Priest-in-Ordinary to H.M. the King. In 1934 he returned 
to Westcott House as Vice-Principal. and in 1938 he was 
appointed Dean of Oriel College. Oxford. 
29. Immediately after the war Collins founded Christian 
Action (Oxford, 1946), an Organisation dedicated to 
getting Christian principles applied to public questions 
and government policies both in national and 
international affairs. He also played a leading role in the 
establishment the British Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND), serving as its chairman from 1958-
1964. See: LPL, L. John Collins Papers MS 3287 
"Miscellaneous Paper.'" 
30. RAF Yates bury normally had in residence two Church of 
England, one Roman Catholic, one Rabbi and two 
"Ordinary Protestant"" chaplains. 
31. LPL, L. John Collins Papers MS 3287, ··Miscellaneous 
Papers: R.A.F. Chaplain. 1940-1945."' 
32. LPL. L. John Collins Papers MS 3287. 
33. LPL, L. John Collins Papers MS 3287. "Background Notes 
to the Fellowship of the Transfiguration of Our Lord," 
wntten by Collins in January 1948: and W. Temple Papers 
v.14, "Correspondence with John Collins."" 1-5 March 
1943. 
34. There were 142 members (86 men and 56 women) in the 
Fellowship one year after its establishment. By March 
1945, membership had increased to just over 200. Collins 
introduced a "'Pastoral Leiter" in 1943. which was 
designed to keep those members who were posted away 
from Yates bury in touch with the "Mother Church." These 
letters were sent out roughly three times a year (see 
endnote 35 below). After the war, U1e Fellowship continued 
in a somewhat smaller form. and as late as 1982 there 
were 83 members still actively involved. 
35. See "Pastoral Letters" of the Fellowship. numbers I-ll, 
covering the period 1942-1945 for Collins, personal views 
12
Canadian Military History, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 2
http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol7/iss1/2
on a "Christian's approach to the war," and his 
exhortations to the members of the Fellowship. LPL, L 
John Collins Papers MS 3287, See also John Collins, 
Faith Under Fire (London. 1966). 
36. Archdeacon Hariill (Chairman) and VicarTB. Scrutton. 
(Vice-Chairman) along with the members of the Anglican 
Pacifist Fellowship, many of them fellow clergy, are 
included in this group. See LPL, C. Lang Papers v,SO and 
W. Temple Papers v.57. 
37. William Shakespeare, Macbeth Act V, Scene V. 
38. Cosmo Lang took the position that the Church was not 
disposed to accept views about the conduct of the war 
from those who objected to it in any shape or form. 
William Temple often described his correspondence with 
those of "the kid-glove" school of warfare as being his 
most tiresome duty of the war. See LPL, C. Lang Papers 
v.SO and W. Temple Papers v.57. Also see F.A Tremonger, 
William Temple: Archbishop of Canterbury: His Life and 
Let.ters (Oxford, 1948) pp.540-544. 
39. For a thoroughly engaging and erudite discussion on 
factors which influence the causes and conduct of war. 
see Ian Clark, Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction 
(Oxford. 1988); and Geoffrey Best, Humanity and 
Wac[ are (London, 1980) pp. 1-9. and chapter IV for Best's 
critical views on aerial bombardment. 
40. It is clear that there was embarrassment immediately 
after the war about the way the bombing campaign had 
been conducted. In August 194 7 the Air Ministry, acting 
on direct instructions from the new Labour Govemment, 
initiated a comprehensive study of the strategic air 
offensives direction and development. Code named 
Exercise THUNDERBOLT. its specific purpose was "to 
highlight I the bomber campaign's] numerous failings." 
Surprisingly. given the political interests behind the 
inquiry. the results were inconclusive. See lWM, Air 
Commodore W. F. Lagdon Papers. DOCS 78/33/1, for a 
complete copy of the llnal report and the various papers 
which outlined the objectives of this exercise. 
41. Correspondence between Ashley Sampson and William 
Temple, the Archbishop of Canterbury, 5-10 December 
1942, LPL, W. Temple Papers v.57. 
42. Geoffrey Francis Fisher succeeded Temple as Archbishop 
of Canterbury in 1945. For the former's views on bombing 
and the position he took towards it see LPL. G. Fisher 
Papersv.5. 
43. A lively correspondence on bombing between Bell and 
both his supporters and detractors can be read in LPL, 
G. Bell Papers v.70. See also Ronald C.D, Jasper, George 
Bell Bishop q[ Chichester (Oxford, 1967) pp.256-287. 
44. LPL, L. John Collins Papers MS 3288, "Correspondence 
with distinguished speakers invited to address The 
Fellowship of the Transformation of Our Lord." 
45. LPL. L. John Collins Papers MS 3288. 
46. MRAF Sir Arthur Travers Harris File, Air Historical 
Branch (RAF), Ministry of Defence, Whitehall. 
47. Letter from Collins to William Temple, 15 May 1944. LPL, 
W. Temple Papers v.14; and 8th Pastoral Letter. 24 August 
1944. in L. John Collins Papers MS 3287. 
48. LPL, L. John Collins Papers MS 3288. 
49. Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby and Squadron Leader 
W.H. Thompson, "Recollections of Sir Stafford Cripp's 
visit to Bomber Command HQ" in LPL, L. John Collins 
Papers MS 3300. See also David Irving, The Destruction 
q{Dresden (London. 1963) pp.51-52. 
50. Thomas Dewar Weldon. better known as Harry Weldon. 
lived the life of a classic Oxford Don except for two 
interruptions brought on by the World Wars. He was 
educated at Magdalen College, Oxford. staying on first as 
a Fellow, then Philosophy Tutor, and later Dean. His 
specialty was the work of Immanuel Kant and in 1945 he 
published Kant's "Critique qf Pure Reason." Later works 
included States and Morals ( 1946) and The Vocabulary 
qf Politics (1953). Never married, he died in 1958. 
51. LPL, L. John Collins Papers MS 3300. 
52. Dudley Saward, Bomber Harris (London, 1984) passim. 
53. The material used to piece together the text of Weldon's 
lecture comes from a number of sources. See LPL. L 
John Collins Papers MS 3300; MRAF Sir Arthur Travers 
Harris File, Air Historical Branch (RAF) MoD Whitehall; 
Sir Arthur Harris Papers H9 "General Correspondence 
1945" and H68 "Official Letters signed by C-in-C in 1944," 
RAF Museum, Hendon; and Dudley Saward, Bomber 
Harris (London, 1984) passim. The BBC made liberal 
reference to a diary kept by Weldon during the war in its 
1989 documentary film on Sir Arthur Harris. 
Unfortunately all attempts to track down this diary have 
failed. If such a diary ever existed. and there is 
considerable doubt that it did, neither the BBC nor 
Magdalen College, Oxford. have any knowledge of its 
present whereabouts. 
54. Albert Speer, Spandau: The Secret Diaries (New York, 
1976) p.340. See also Scot Robertson, "In the Shadow of 
Death by Moonlight" in David J. Bercuson and S.F. Wise 
(eds.) The Valour and the Horror Revisited pp.178-9 (note 
59). 
55. Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries 1942-1943 
translated by Louis Lochner (New York, 1948) pp.386, 
404-5. 532; and The Diaries q[ Joseph Goebbels- Final 
Entries 1945 translated by Richard Barry (New York, 
1978) passim. 
56. See Field Marshal Albrecht Kesselring, The Memoirs qf 
Field Marshal Kesselring (London, 1953); General Sir 
David Fraser. Knight's Cross: A L![e oj Field Marshal 
Erwin Rommel (London, 1993); B. H. Liddell Hart (ed.) 
The Rommel Papers (London, 1953); Charles Messenger, 
The Last Prussian: A Biography q{Field Marshal Gerd 
vonRundstedt 1875-1953 (London, 1991 ); PROWO 232/ 
93 General Hasso von Manteuffel, "Grossdeutschland" 
Report (1944); and General F.W. von Mellen thin, Panzer 
Battles (London, 1955). 
57. SAOGv.III, p.310. 
58. Richard J. Overy, War and Economy in the Third Reich 
(Oxford, 1994) p.373. 
59. Ibid., pp.373-4, 
60. Sir Michael Howard, "Ethics, Deterrence and Strategic 
Bombing, The Journal of the RAF Historical Society 
no.14 ( 1995) p.lS. 
61. SAOGv.lll, p.310. See also the introduction by Sebastian 
Cox and the German view by Horst Boog in Sir Arthur 
Harris, Despatch on War Operat.ions (London, 1996). 
David Hall is a recent graduate of the University 
of Oxford, where he obtained a DPhil in Modern 
British History. For the past four years he has 
been a full-time temporary lecturer in the History 
Department at the Royal Military College of 
Canada. His specialty is air power and the 
history of the RAF, and his first book, entitled 
Strategyjor Victory: The Development oj British 
Tactical Air Power, 1919-1943, is scheduled for 
release this autumn. 
19 
13
Hall: “Black, White and Grey”
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998
